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Integrated Coastal 
Zone Management: 
four entrenched illusions
Raphaël Billé
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations
(IDDRI), 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75337 Paris Cedex 07, France.
This paper is a revised version of an article originally published by VertigO-La revue électronique en sciences
de l’environnement (Billé, 2006).
The considerable efforts undertaken on all continents to carry out ﬁeld experiments and reﬁne the
concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) have resulted in its adoption as the key
paradigm for the sustainable development of coastal areas. Having reached a ﬁrst phase of maturity,
ICZM should now be challenged by critical assessments if it is to advance both theoretically and
operationally. In this perspective, our paper highlights four deep-rooted illusions: the illusion that
round table discussions can solve any problem, the coastal manager myth, the community illusion
and the positivist illusion. It is argued that these illusions result from unproved conceptual over-
simpliﬁcations and lead to a naive conception of action that often impedes ICZM implementation.
Keywords: Integrated coastal zone management, illusion, participation,
coastal manager, local community, consultation, positivism, decision making
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1 ICZM: “dynamic process in which a coordinated strategy is developed and implemented for the allocation of environmental, socio-cultural and institutional resources to achieve the
conservation and sustainable multiple use of the coastal zone” deﬁnition from the Charleston Workshop (see Billé, 2004).
2 Illusion: a false appearance or deceptive impression of reality or a false or misleading idea or belief.
3 Coordination: the regulation of diverse elements into an integrated and harmonious operation—in our case environmental protection.
4 Consultation: used in a broad sense: “The deliberation and exchange of advice for the purpose of conﬂict management, decision making and the issue of concerted directives” It does
not refer to a speciﬁc set of practices that could be opposed to public debate, negotiation or participation (Mermet, 2005).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Born into the scientiﬁc community in the 1970s, the concept of
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)1 shaped in the
1980s, was ﬁrst deﬁned properly at the Charleston Workshop in
1989 and entered the international political scene during the Rio
Earth Summit in 1992. Since then, it has been elaborated at all
geographical levels. Considerable efforts have been undertaken
on all continents to carry out ﬁeld experiments and reﬁne the
understanding of this complex concept. Hundreds of scientiﬁc
articles and good practices guidelines, often based on case
studies, have explored the signiﬁcance of ICZM, how it should be
implemented, by whom, by what means, etc.
Over the years, ICZM has probably reached a ﬁrst phase of
maturity. While much remains to be done to fully implement it,
it has been adopted as the key paradigm for the sustainable
development of coastal areas around the world. It is supported
by an organised community of scientists and practitioners, and
has substantial resources for both research and
implementation. It is now a major public policy issue even in
countries that were for a long time reticent—for example
France which is currently trying hard to make up for the time
lost during the 1990s.
Consequently, as any established bodies, ICZM can now be
tested, questioned and even challenged theoretically and in
practice. No doubt it must be to progress: Following Olivier de
Sardan (1995), we consider that in such a ﬁeld teeming with
normative points of view, preconceived notions, good
intentions, presupposed morals, ideological rhetoric and
boisterous declarations, the understanding and analysis of the
real mechanisms and social processes in play are just as
needed as good advice and “new” ideas—if not more. We
therefore openly adopt a more critical rather than propositional
approach in this article. We base our analysis on our
experience in designing, implementing and evaluating
operational projects in developed and developing countries, as
well as on an ensemble of fundamental research undertaken
within or in partnership with ENGREF (École Nationale du
Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Paris, France). A collective
project conducted from 1998 to 2003 on the Strategic Analysis
of Environmental Management (Analyse Stratégique de la
Gestion de l’Environnement (ASGE)) (see Mermet et al., 2005)
offered new perspectives on ICZM, mobilizing theoretical
resources which seem to be underused. 
The body of references of ICZM was wrought in an
interdisciplinary context, melting social and natural sciences
with the expertise of various NGOs, international organizations,
etc. (Billé, 2007a). It is one of the reasons for the wealth and
variety of this body of knowledge, but also explains some of its
weaknesses and notably some over-simpliﬁcations leading to a
series of recurring illusions 2. To stick to our objective to
challenge ICZM theoretically, we will concentrate on four of
these tenacious illusions which though not all-pervasive, are no
less structuring: the illusion that round table discussions can
solve any problem, the coastal manager myth, the community
illusion and the positivist illusion. It is argued that these
illusions result from unproved conceptual over-simpliﬁcations
and lead to a naive conception of action that often impedes ICZM
implementation. If this work criticises certain “beliefs”,
illustrated by examples, it does not target ICZM as a whole.
Readers may judge the signiﬁcance of one point or another—
and thereby the relevance of our approach—as it relates to their
own professional environment.
2. THE ILLUSION THAT ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS CAN SOLVE ANY PROBLEM
2.1. A WIDESPREAD BELIEF
“Managing environmental problems consists in bringing all the
stakeholders to sit and discuss around the same table”. In our
view, this motto frequently heard in a wide range of contexts, is
emblematic of a simplistic belief widely spread in ICZM
communities, and beyond, in all ﬁelds related to environmental
management. It is based on three mental shortcuts that ﬂow into
an implicit reasoning: ﬁrst, environmental management is a
problem of coordination 3 between stakeholders; Second,
consultation 4 is the solution to this lack of coordination; ﬁnally,
consultation is inseparable from consensus. The purpose here is
not to challenge the real beneﬁts of concerted action, nor the
ones of building consensus, but to show the major
inconveniences that result from these mental shortcuts. 
2.1.1. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
AS AN ISSUE OF COORDINATION
The concept of (integrated) environmental management has been
considered as a response to a lack of coordination between
stakeholders and uses (Babin et al, 1999), whether that be due to
a simple lack of communication or because stakeholders follow
diverging logics resting on real antagonisms. In this view, it is the
lack of coordination that creates environmental problems,
conﬂicts, and/or limits the efﬁciency of actions undertaken to
favour environmental protection.
If the concept of coordination means “the regulation of diverse
elements into an integrated and harmonious operation”—in our
case environmental protection, this approach to environmental
management is quite acceptable, even if it may be a bit twisted
(isn’t coordination a “black box”? Does presenting environmental
management as a pure problem of coordination tacitly imply the
existence of one general interest, with objectives common to
society as a whole?). In any case we deliberately choose to accept
it here, in order to better understand the shift leading to “the
illusion of round table discussion”.
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5 Pareto improvement: Given a set of alternative allocations (goods, income, etc.) for a set of individuals, a Pareto improvement is a movement from one allocation to another that can
make at least one individual better off without making any other individual worse off. The term is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who used the concept in his studies
of economic efﬁciency and income distribution.
2.1.2. CONSULTATION AS THE SOLUTION 
TO THE LACK OF COORDINATION
Consultation appears as a mean of choice to improve
coordination. It has become the main reference for action in the
integrated management of coastal areas. In this framework,
concerted management and integrated management are used
almost indifferently (see Pennanguer, 2005). Frequently, the
issue is cast as being: “stakeholders are not coordinated, if a
forum is set up they can become so”, or in other words:,
“stakeholders are not talking to each other—let’s bring them to
the table”. In this case, it is believed that “the simple fact of
talking will improve behaviour”, and assumed that discussions
will free imaginations and pave the way to innovative solutions. If
such assumptions are correct in some cases, other case studies
notably from France (Billé, 2001) and Madagascar (Billé and
Mermet, 2002a) have provided extremely variable results and
preclude gross generalization.
It appears in particular that whenever the environmental issue is
not trivial, the problems with the management system—
considered to be the result of a lack of coordination—cannot be
resolved merely through the creation of a discussion forum for
the stakeholders. In some cases, neither can they be resolved
with more sophisticated consultation processes. The relationship
between coordination and consultation is not obvious. Like
integration, coordination, if it is indeed a way to better manage the
environment, cannot be decreed (Billé, 2004): it is not a process
that one can decide to implement. It comes from the actual or
informal organization of the stakeholders system, in the sense
meant by March and Simon (1969), and not from its formal
organization.
2.1.3. CONSENSUS BUILDING 
AS THE PARADIGM OF CONSULTATION
The shortcut that makes the illusion of round table discussions so
successful thus rests ﬁrstly on the conception that environmental
management is a problem of coordination, secondly on the
predominance of consultation as the best means to improve
coordination. The last simpliﬁcation is that consensus is
inseparable from consultation. 
In the cases we have studied, the results of consensual concerted
processes have generally remained unconvincing. Few innovative
solutions actually emerged from supposedly freed imaginations.
Why then are such approaches so widespread? In fact it seems
that concerted processes tend to satisfy—in the short term—
most stakeholders: For example, environmentalists who
generally are in a “weak position” relative to others (Mermet,
1998), feel that they achieve their goals more effectively this way
than through open conﬂict. On the contrary, actors whose poorly
regulated activities tend to degrade the environment prefer a
consensual approach because it is a kind of assurance that
changes they are not ready to comply with (even after
negotiations and readjustment of positions) will not be imposed.
In developed countries, these actors ﬁrst experienced—just as
environmentalists did—a time of conﬂicts (Dziedzicki, 2001). This
ultimately resulted in litigations, extremely time-consuming and
expensive trials, and to the damage of their public images.
Therefore, any approach that establishes them as partners rather
than adversaries is welcome. Finally, it is often in the interest of
political leaders to avoid or minimize conﬂicts.
The consensual search for coordination via consultation
underestimates the real antagonisms that exist between
“uncoordinated” stakeholders and uses, the differences of
interests and of representations. These antagonisms are
evacuated rather than acknowledged and managed. The problem
is two-fold: on the one hand, setting a problem in a collective
framework is not sufﬁcient to transform it into a collective
concern (Mermet, 1992); on the other hand, consensual methods
(i.e. to make a problem everyone’s concern) are not the only
means available to set problems in a collective framework.
2.2. INTEGRATION AND DISTRIBUTION
At the beginning of a conﬂict management process, one cannot
predict or decide a priori to proceed only by consensus, because
several stakeholders usually have to be driven to do what they do
not willingly do. If we limit ourselves (1) to incite changes of
behaviour by raising awareness, and (2) to obtain Pareto
improvements 5, we cannot hope to make signiﬁcant changes to
environmental management systems, except in simplistic cases
hardly representative of the complexity of management situations
stakeholders are most often faced with. It is therefore inevitable
that some stakeholders, whose logic of action is opposed to the
sustainable management of coastal areas, enter and leave
integrated management processes, are consulted and then feel
they have lost, were cheated, and proclaim their discontent.
Integrated management is not necessarily a zero-sum game.
However, there is often a pie to share, and trade-offs must be
found that go against certain interests while favouring others.
Just as Walton and McKersie (1965) emphasize that any
negotiation, has an integrative and a distributive dimension, it
appears that integrated management is also, despite its name, a
“distributive management”, consisting of distributing
inconveniences amongst stakeholders. A purely consensual and
cooperative approach is therefore conceivable if and only if, for
some particular reason, there is no distributive dimension to a
speciﬁc management case.
Overhauling the illusion that round table discussion is the
solution to all problems, requires that conﬂict be reintroduced as
being a fundamental phenomenon in environmental
management situations: it is the split, created at some point by a
conﬂict, between the way the environment is managed and the
collective objectives in the matter, “that offer the space where a
community can deal with these questions while representing
both the disease and the doctor” (Mermet, 1992). Pushing this
idea even further, it could be argued that it is necessary, for an
are quite common. We provide two illustrations, one from a report
done by experts and the other from a scientiﬁc publication:
• ”To date, there is no institute that has complete
responsibility and authority over the management of
coastal and marine resources in Indonesia. The absence of
such an institution means that the ocean is managed by
sectoral institutions with varied interests. This frequently
creates conﬂicts of interest in the utilisation of resources”
(Dahuri, 1999).
And concerning the Mumbai Metropolitan Region in India: 
“There are several institutions and agencies (...) [which] function
separately and are responsible for various activities and
enforcement of laws in the (....) coastal region. (...) A centralized
establishment specializing in coastal and marine affairs whose
function would be to oversee the ongoing coastal activities and
to coordinate between these agencies, is necessary” (Murthy, 
et al, 2001). 
The concept of “coastal manager” used in these examples or
elsewhere, comes from a speciﬁc view of environmental
management: like a garden is managed by a gardener,
“management is often taken in the sense of direct control where
the manager leads a society and its environment to a desired
state, like a motorist drives his car where he wishes” (Mermet,
1992). Although this conception may be relevant in certain speciﬁc
cases of protected areas (especially private) or forests (managed
by foresters), it is obvious that generally speaking an ecosystem
with multiples uses is not, and cannot, be managed by an
“ecosystemer” anymore than a coast can be managed by a
coastal manager. There is truly a “coastal management”
associated to any given coastal region (the way it is managed, its
actual management), but there are numerous managers with
none having, nor being able to exercise leadership over the others
a priori. In other words, one can say that the management of
coastal areas is a process without a pilot, a management without
a manager.
3.3. REASONS FOR A WELL-ENTRENCHED ILLUSION
We propose three distinctions to enlighten the processes 
involved behind this simpliﬁed view of a coastal manager, and 
its consequences.
3.3.1. ICZM AND ICZM PROJECTS
First, there is a shift from ICZM to ICZM projects that we have
described and analysed elsewhere (Billé, 2007b). This could be
one of the reasons that explain the appearance and the
robustness of the “coastal manager” ﬁgure. For example, as
described in Burbridge (1997), ICZM is considered only through
projects, each being led by a project manager: by approximation,
the coastal manager (whether that be an individual or a legal
body) is in fact the manager of the coastal management project.
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environmental problem to be effectively handled, that the various
parties involved reach a deadlock, following a period of conﬂict.
One then becomes fully aware of the balance of power between
stakeholders, and by extension of all power relationships. We
recommend that stakeholders involved in integrated coastal zone
management incorporate these three notions—conﬂicts, balance
and relationships of powers—in their strategic vision.
2.3. FROM FORMAL INTEGRATION TO ACTUAL INTEGRATION
Finally, what environmental management needs is actual
integration (meaning “everything occurs as if” the stakeholders
were coordinated). Formal integration (institutional or
procedural) is only one way to succeed. Coordination can be
achieved via a wide variety of other means, ranging from informal
and consensual discussions to formal negotiations and even
centralised decision-making by a single decision-maker. In fact,
the means towards more integrated management are of two
kinds (Mermet, 1998): on the one hand, tools that can regulate
human activities (taxes, laws, agreements, norms, decrees, etc.),
and on the other hand processes through which these regulations
can be designed (trade-offs, negotiations, dialogue,
communication, awareness raising, etc.). The issue is to wisely
marshal both kinds of means to reach an arrangement of
stakeholders within the socio-ecosystem (the “diverse elements”
according to the glossary deﬁnition) that allows the preservation
and/or the restoration of desirable qualities of ecosystems (the
“integrated and harmonious operation” of this same deﬁnition). 
3. THE COASTAL MANAGER MYTH: 
IS A COAST ACTUALLY MANAGED 
BY A COASTAL MANAGER?
3.1. THE COASTAL MANAGER, AN EMBLEMATIC FIGURE 
IN THE LITERATURE
In 1995, the Coastal Resources Center of the University of Rhode
Island and the USAID (United States Agency for International
Development) organised a one-week international workshop
called “Educating Coastal Managers” (Crawford et al, 1995).
Olsen described on this occasion the “skills, knowledge and
attitudes of the ideal coastal manager” (Olsen, 1995). Cicin-Sain
and Knecht (1998), in their famous book, afﬁrm that “the coastal
manager must be realistic and avoid turning integrated coastal
management into a kind of crusade”.
Who is this coastal manager described in the literature?
3.2. THE COASTAL MANAGER, INDIVIDUAL OR LEGAL ENTITY
The analysis of the literature reveals that in fact, behind the ﬁgure
of an individual “coastal manager” lies the idea that the
management of a given coastal area can be entrusted to a single
agency—a structure that could then be incarnated by one or
several “coastal managers.” Examples of authors who lament
that such an agency is missing and who recommend its creation
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This leads to an important paradox, the ignorance of which seems
to be the basis of many works on ICZM: a coastal management
project does not manage a coast! It is only one of the many
interventions contributing to its actual (or concrete)
management. Hence the coastal management project manager
should not be called the coastal manager.
Nevertheless, this conceptual approximation offers practical
advantages which may explain its success, at least in part:
First, it enables somehow the construction of the reality one
claims to study: the unjustiﬁed primacy of the project approach
legitimises to refer to the coastal manager and to the required
qualities and skills he/she must possess.
Then, this over-simpliﬁcation sidesteps having to ask some very
important questions which could generate dissensions (Who,
exactly, does what? With what mandate? On whose behalf? For
what purpose?). By referring to a coastal manager who in reality
does not exist, everyone can lay claim to successes, without
having to worry over the failures.
Finally, the simplistic idea of a direct control of a natural system
by a single manager is all the more widespread as it appeals to
certain leaders who do not want to give the impression that a
problem, whatever it may be, could be beyond their control.
The immense diversity of the ICZM literature offers other
concepts that in our opinion are actually much more relevant,
general and in touch with the real world: “ICZM practitioners”
(Olsen, 1996), “ICZM professionals” (Crawford et al, 1995), or even
“ICZM facilitators” (Hénocque, personal communication), the
latter being probably the one that best describes the human and
individual, or organizational dimensions of reality. 
3.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION: 
FORMAL OR INFORMAL ORGANIZATION?
In terms of organization, the distinction introduced earlier made
by March and Simon (1969) between formal and informal (or
“actual”) organization is again particularly revealing here. Indeed,
the illusion of a single management structure for coastal areas
has its roots in the very foundations of ICZM. OECD (1993) conveys
this idea by recommending “an integrated institutional
arrangement” for the management of coastal areas. Although
this institutional arrangement can in principle be understood in
an informal sense of actual organization, it is usually understood
in a more formal sense: that is, more integration (meaning better
actual organization) can be achieved only through an ad hoc
institution (i.e. formal organization).
Both examples cited above illustrate well the point of view
favouring a single structure of management. Miossec (1998)
provides even more unequivocal examples: he interprets the
absence of a ministry of the sea in France as a refusal “to
integrate the various administrations dealing with the sea”, as
opposed to “South Korea (...) which has chosen (...) to integrate all
administrations with jurisdiction over the sea and coast”. The
words “refusal” or “chosen” are telltale signs of the idea that
integration has to be decreed. While on the contrary, we think that
the real integration of a management system is a progressive
process, implemented via incremental steps and never fully
achieved (Hénocque and Billé, 2005). The kind of integration that
can be described as formal (via the creation of an ad hoc
organization), is at best one of several means available to achieve
more integrated actual management. At its worst, this option has
two major drawbacks:
When it comes to gathering “the administrations with jurisdiction
over the sea and coast” under one single organizational entity,
this option is illusory because such an entity could potentially
gather all administrations (including some very important and in
themselves integrating ministries such as the departments of
Economy, Agriculture, or Equipment).
When this type of integration is “decreed” it could be counter-
productive, since it does nothing to modify the balance of powers
between sectors and interest groups. Rather, they are played out
beneath the surface, instead of out in the open. This could
interfere with what we consider to be one of the crucial elements
for a more sustainable management of coastal zones: the
readability of the management system, thereby making unclear
the practices that underlie pluralistic debate.
3.3.3. A BIASED OUTLOOK OF COASTAL ZONE SPECIALISTS
Last, from a cultural point of view, wanting to formally integrate
organizations with jurisdiction over coastal zones and the sea,
and believing that it is possible and advisable, are views that
come from the standpoint of coastal specialists. Considering a
portion of a territory and its resources as a coast reﬂects, in
itself, a speciﬁc outlook. For example, what may be deﬁned as a
coastal area is also part of a watershed for a water
management specialist: as such, it requires another
mechanism of institutional integration.
Although the concept of coastal area has shown to be valuable for
heuristic and operational reasons, one must be aware that it is
not necessarily the only relevant concept, even for the interface
between land and sea. Other ﬁelds of study use other “integration
variables” besides the coastal environment (which is de facto the
raison d’être of ICZM). Therefore, formal integration should not
be sought systematically, even though it may be an option on a
case-by-case basis.
3.4. ACCEPTING A MULTI-LAYERED POLITICAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, TYPICAL OF A COMPLEX 
ALLOCATION OF ROLES
In our opinion, the coastal manager concept conveniently veils a
reality by blurring power struggles and conﬂicts. Its most
commonly held belief—that it is possible and advisable to entrust
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the management of a given coastal area to a single body—often
proves to be counter-productive. Indeed, it tends to result in the
creation of “monstrous” hybrid entities that more often than not
become sectoral and/or autonomous (Billé and Mermet, 2002b). 
Of course, some simpliﬁcations in coastal zone management
systems are advisable when conceived on a case-by-case
basis and strategically justiﬁed. They can, however, concern
objects other than institutions, like laws that need to be
harmonised or bundled together. In fact, merging two entities
or sub-entities into a single agency simpliﬁes the
organization chart, but not the way the management system
operates (or the “operational chart”). With regards to
integrating management, it does nothing to resolve the
conﬂicts due to diverging logics that may have placed both
entities in opposing camps before their merging. Typically,
merging the departments of agriculture and environment
cannot be considered in itself as a step towards a more
sustainable agriculture or as a mean of levelling off conﬂicts
between the two sectors.
Environmental management, and especially coastal
management, is an irreparably complex phenomenon. Instead of
trying to simplify and control it, it is preferable to endeavour to
inﬂuence the management systems as they are and progressively
instil changes conducive to reaching the stated objectives. In
other words, the “multi-layered political administrative system”
notoriously criticised in the ICZM literature—and to which single
management agencies (coastal managers) are often opposed—
can only be marginally simpliﬁed. It is neither a temporary ﬂaw in
the system nor a short-term administrative aberration: it is
structurally inevitable. Stakeholders in the management of
coastal zones, as well as researchers, have no choice but to
accept that the allocation of roles is complex. They need to
develop action and research strategies accordingly.
4. THE COMMUNITY ILLUSION
Less speciﬁc than the coastal manager myth, the illusion related
to coastal management by “local communities” is rooted in
beliefs which thoroughly span both the ﬁelds of environmental
management and that of development assistance—and are
especially tenacious at the crossing of the two. Our objective in
this section is not to deny opportunities provided by decentralised
environmental management down to the local/village level—a
level that is just as important as the regional, national, and
international ones. Nevertheless, we will attempt to highlight and
explain the different dimensions of this “community illusion”, the
practical consequences of which are signiﬁcant and sometimes
disastrous. We will ﬁrst elaborate our points by referring to the
developing world, where cases of community-related over-
simpliﬁcations are most signiﬁcant, before widening the
demonstration to developed countries. We will rely especially on
anthropological literature, which has for decades ceaselessly
denounced the community illusion—while being largely
responsible for its inception.
4.1. THE COMMUNITY ILLUSION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In the ﬁelds of environmental and coastal management, the
phrase “local community” is so predominant that it would
probably be challenging to ﬁnd a single international publication
that did not make reference to it these past ﬁfteen years. Various
dimensions of the illusion associated to “community-based
environmental management”, “management by local
communities” etc. have been described by Michon (2002):
The ﬁrst dimension of this illusion concerns the ﬁeld of
development cooperation as a whole: it is the postulated belief
that there are coherent, egalitarian, and consensual village
communities. Olivier de Sardan (1995) describes “this tenacious
and widespread myth of ‘traditional collectivism’ which still
persists and upon which development plans would be supposed
to rest. (...) Rural Africa would be the continent of the collective,
the kingdom of consensus”. Moreover, customary rights and
traditions would be egalitarian.
The corollary of this illusion of homogeneity and consensus is the
popular hypothesis that “village communities” have legitimate
leaders (traditional chefs) who are respected by all, and are a
priori less corrupt than the civil servants and elected ofﬁcials
belonging to the various levels of government. It would therefore
be possible and advisable to rely on them for most interventions.
A third dimension of the community illusion relates more
speciﬁcally to the ﬁeld of environmental management: “local
communities” would have a sound knowledge (even if not
Cartesian) of their surroundings, they would have inherited an
eco-friendly ancestral tradition (consciously or not), and they
would have an objective interest in the sustainable management
of the natural resources upon which rests their subsistence.
Combined, these three elements would represent a guarantee
that natural resources entrusted to “local communities” are
managed more wisely and sustainably.
Finally, each “local community” would have a clearly identiﬁed
and deﬁned territory.
Although one of these hypotheses can be matched from time to
time and in speciﬁc cases, their general fallacy has been
demonstrated extensively by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk
(Olivier de Sardan, 1995; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1998),
Michon (2002), or Smith (2001) on the supposedly
conservationism of “indigenous peoples”.
4.2. ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNITY ILLUSION 
4.2.1. OVER-ASSIMILATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY 
AND LOCAL LEVEL
An important basis giving credence to the above illusion is the
confusion between the concept of “community” and the local
level. Many researchers and practitioners do not hesitate to use
the term “community level” when referring to the local level.
Literature on ICZM provides striking examples: for example,
Burbridge (1997) uses the phrase “at the local/community level”,
Olsen (1993) speaks seemingly indifferently of “small-scale
community level” or simply “community level”. The local level
would thus be a community by deﬁnition, and conversely a
community would be intrinsically local.
The ﬁrst of these two propositions has been amply refuted by
anthropologists. In short, in response to the hypothesis that the
smaller the scale, the more consensual the human groups,
Douglas (1999) states that “it is not a question of scale”. She
further argues that there is no reason to have different
interpretation principles for small groups and for large ones.
Conversely, the concept of community is used almost exclusively
to describe the local level: Douglas (1999) highlights that
according to Taylor (1982) “the community is by deﬁnition small”.
Indeed, communities are associated to consensus and consensus
is said to be reached more easily in small groups.
Nevertheless, it is helpful to discuss the community issue in
relation to two concepts that are consubstantial with it (Narcy,
2000): the commons (or common property) and subsidiarity.
4.2.2. A COMMUNITY IS DEFINED BY THE OBJECT 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Any community is actually deﬁned as a community of use or
management, and not a priori by geographical or social
characteristics. As clearly illustrated by the example of rural
communities that came into being in France during the Middle
Age (Bourgoin, 1991) to manage the “commons” (common-
property or common-use ﬁelds), local communities exist because
of the “commons” they manage intentionally and collectively. As
Narcy (2000) explains: “The grouping of individuals (...) enables
the development of a kind of ‘collective consciousness’ making it
possible for them to think beyond their private interests. However,
the development of a ‘collective consciousness’ in a community is
not, as in Durkheim, the realisation of a general will in
accordance with the general interest of citizens: it is merely the
realisation of a common will as it pertains to uses of a speciﬁc
common”. Contrary to a widely held view, a community is not
deﬁned by the consensus but by the object of collective action
around which individuals decide to rally.
4.2.3. FROM SUBSIDIARITY TO LOCAL MANAGEMENT
The confusion surrounding the principle of subsidiarity—a
principle that has widely been vindicated in theory—also plays a
major role in the community illusion. This principle is often
misunderstood as simply delegating management to the local
level—especially in the ﬁeld of environment. This is a revealing
over-simpliﬁcation deeply anchored in developmental
cooperation research and projects. It demonstrates the tropism
towards the local level largely due to the ﬁeld’s conceptual
understanding of “local communities”. Yet, far from meaning
delegating (environmental management among other things) to
local levels, “subsidiarity is granting autonomy for as long as the
individual can adequately take charge. When the individual
cannot, the responsibility moves to the level above, the family. The
family in turn is embedded in a corporative level/higher
cooperative, and in this way one progressively moves up, and if
need be, up to the State” (Barraqué, 1997). Subsidiarity therefore
does not mean delegating to the local level, but to the lowest
competent authority for a given problem -the difference is crucial.
4.2.4. SOME BACKGROUND
Among all the concepts related to “participation”, the one of
“community-based management” is probably the most
structuring, and constitutes a central paradigm in the ﬁelds of
research and action at the interface between environment and
development.
Anthropologists and sociologists played a deciding role in its
burst onto the global scene, at a time when technocratic views of
development and environment were dominant. The rationality of
“community-based management” was built upon four pillars: (i)
in or surrounding ecosystems that needed protection, there lived
inhabitants; (ii) these inhabitants depended mostly upon the
exploitation of natural resources for their subsistence; (iii)
however, these inhabitants were forcibly denied their use rights
due to the designation of nature reserves or protected species;
ﬁnally (iv) in some cases inhabitants had knowledge and
experience that could be efﬁcient assets contributing to a more
sustainable management of natural resources. It is nonetheless
striking that anthropologists, without disavowing this four-fold
elementary diagnosis, are among those who most virulently
attack the community illusion (Olivier de Sardan, 1995; Douglas,
1999; Bako-Arifari and Le Meur, 2001) and its environmental
variations (Smith, 2001; Michon, 2002).
Concepts cautiously used by anthropologists have thus been
appropriated, deformed, exaggerated and even diverted. This has
been done as much by the institutions that were targeted in the
original criticism, as by the numerous counter-powers (notably
NGOs and research centres). Why could this happen? How did
concepts like “community level” be taken up by such a variety of
institutions and stakeholders?
4.2.5. THE COMMUNITY ILLUSION, 
AN IDEOLOGICAL CROSSROADS
Pelletier has documented how the community utopia builds
bridges between social Catholics and Christian democrats,
Marxists, Vichy regime ideologists (notably through the
corporatist illusion), Third World supporters and -from the 1950s-
developmental discourse of the main international organisations.
The history of the association Economie et Humanisme centred
on the community utopia (and its founder Dominican priest Louis-
Joseph) shows successive and concurrent interactions, without
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any major change or denial, with all those currents of thought, in
the space of only 25 years (1941-1966) (Pelletier, 1996). What can
anarchists, neo-liberals, ideologists of the Vichy regime, Third-
World supporters, hippies and catholic activists have in common?
An unwavering faith in local communities and their capacity to
manage more public affairs than they do. While this is in no way
an attempt to lump together these various currents of thought,
this works simply shows the astonishing universality of “the
community utopia” and accounts for the consensus that
surrounds it and explains the difﬁculty to challenge it.
From another angle, making “community-based management”
the paradigm of “civil society” participation can simultaneously
be a justiﬁcation for the withdrawal of the State, an argument for
conﬁning civil society to the role of social and environmental
saviour and thereby leaving solvent sectors to the private sector
(Lévy, 2000). It can result in either a consolidation of the existing
social order or inversely in its radical reversal. The community
illusion hence makes possible the most improbable alliances
between multinational companies and Third World supporters,
orthodox economists and “ungrowth” advocates. In short: the
most ardent environmentalists see in community-based
management a way to sidestep forces generally perceived as
being counterproductive or inefﬁcient; while their opponents see
an opportunity to portray local inhabitants as victims of either
state regulation, urban concerns or Western “ecological
interference” (Rossi, 2000).
The “community” as the paradigm of public participation turns
out to be a formidable machine deﬂating political considerations
in ﬁelds such as development and environmental management,
which are essentially political. Its appeal to a wide variety of
stakeholders is a basic reason for its semantic success, including
within ICZM.
4.3. THE “LOCAL COMMUNITY” IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTH
As stated, we have ﬁrst focused on the context of developing
countries. In developed countries, the utilisation of different
dimensions of the community illusion is more heterogeneous. We
distinguish three typical positions:
In North America, the concept of community is widely used in
socio-politics. In many cases, there are simultaneously the
illusions of group coherence, of homogeneity, of consensus, and
the assimilation between community and local level. While
communities and neighbourhoods appear to be quite similar
entities, communities probably sprang from shared religion (a
common place of worship), common history (especially when
going back to the Pioneer Era), and ethnological characteristics
(native populations).
Within international organizations, the concept of local community
quickly made its way into the rhetoric of environmental
management, and not only in the context of developing countries:
e.g. it can be found several times in Agenda 21 (United Nations,
1992), including in Chapter 17 on the protection of oceans and
coastal zones. However, it is remarkable to notice that strictly
“northern” organizations seem to ignore it: “local communities”
appear neither in OECD guidelines (1993), nor in most European
publications (Humphrey and Burbridge, 1999; King, 1999;
European Commision, 2001), where we encounter instead phrases
like citizens, actors, stakeholders, local populations, people, or in
coastal areas ﬁshermen, farmers, etc. To refer to local territories,
the terms used are villages, rural communes, townships...
Finally, in France and Japan , like in other countries that do not
have Anglo-Saxon political culture, the concept of “local
community” is uncommon, never spoken of by political leaders
and rarely by researchers.
It is therefore interesting to note that when the matter concerns
developing countries, especially Africa, European researchers
and policy makers unhesitatingly resort to “local communities”
as a structuring concept in their discourse and action. This proves
that the community illusion inﬂuences the particular views held
on these countries; whereas to a great extent “analysis of Africa
[and the rest of the developing world] must be rid of all illusions
of community, like everywhere else” (Olivier de Sardan, 1995). 
5. THE POSITIVIST ILLUSION
5.1. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITION TO WELL-MANAGED COASTAL ZONES?
The hypothesis that “more knowledge brings better
management” (Miossec, 1998) is well known. Literally, it implies
that knowledge is a sufﬁcient condition to ensure better
management. This proposition can be refuted by providing a
cohort of counter examples such as the French marshland called
“Marais Poitevin” (Billé, 2004), or the case of the blueﬁn tuna in
the Mediterranean. At best, one can assert that more knowledge
is susceptible to encourage better management. 
Conversely, it is often stated that “a problem can be seriously
addressed only with a complete command of all data” (Miossec,
1993). Is thorough knowledge really an absolute prerequisite to
deal seriously and efﬁciently with problems? This is a more
complicated question and requires that the place taken by
scientiﬁc and technical approaches in environmental
management be fully appreciated. We will discuss only certain
salient points to highlight the issues resulting from this double
positivist illusion.
5.2. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IS INEVITABLY INCOMPLETE 
AND CONTROVERSIAL
Obviously, knowing everything about everything is impossible.
The level of scientiﬁc knowledge necessary to make completely
informed decisions to manage ecosystems sustainably—
especially coastal—will never be at hand. Nature varies too much
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in time and space. As demonstrated theoretically by Johannes
(1998), the inception of rational management of Indonesian coral
reefs alone would require at least 400 person-years to collect
data only. And then this data would have to be continuously
updated. Generally speaking, a certain degree of scientiﬁc
uncertainty is a characteristic of environmental management.
Furthermore, there is no reason to a priori assume the data
collected will be accurate, nor consensual among the scientiﬁc
community and stakeholders. Disagreement and debate are just
as intrinsic—and beneﬁcial—to science as uncertainty is an
integral part of management.
5.3. THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE JUSTIFIES INACTION
What kind of scientiﬁc knowledge is necessary to take a completely
informed decision is probably not the most pertinent question—in
any case it is not the only one. The gaps and contradictions in
scientiﬁc knowledge are often used on the one hand as excuses to
delay difﬁcult trade-off decisions, and on the other hand to advance
or justify decisions or non-decisions unfavourable to the
environment. From the international level down to the local one,
strategies typically used in anti-environmental rhetoric are based
on refuting scientiﬁc reports, discrediting the experts who
produced them, and putting forth research favourable to other
concerns (Rowell, 1996). To fully comprehend the relationship
between science and action, one has to keep in mind that every
environmental problem can be reformulated in such a way that the
available scientiﬁc knowledge becomes insufﬁcient to justify
action. Overﬁshing in Europe, or until recently the issue of climate
change in the Unites States, are good illustrations.
5.4. KNOWLEDGE, A STRATEGIC ISSUE AND A LEVER FOR ACTION
It seems obvious—and this is certainly not a new ﬁnding in action
sciences—that scientiﬁc knowledge is not only a possible lever for
action. It is also, perhaps above all, a strategic object used
regularly by stakeholders to achieve their respective objectives.
As highlighted by Crozier and Friedberg (1992), “uncertainty in
general or speciﬁc uncertainties (...) are the main resources in
any negotiation. (...) What is deemed uncertainty from the point of
view of the problem, is power from the point of view of
stakeholders”. Knowledge is a strategic issue and therefore also
an issue of power. One of the deﬁning traits of power is precisely
the capacity “to speak instead of listening, to be able to afford not
to learn” (Deutsch, 1963). It is tempting to add that power is also
the ability to make controversial decisions where scientiﬁc
preoccupations are but one consideration among many. To a
certain extent, gathering information and making decisions are
two disconnected activities. They share neither the same logic,
nor the same timeframe.
5.5. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND “DATA-LESS MANAGEMENT”
Coastal zone management is built as much upon power
struggles, negotiations, as on scientiﬁc knowledge that is
essentially incomplete and controversial. It is therefore necessary
to acknowledge that coastal zone management is seldom fully
consistent with available information: most often, coastal zones
are managed worst than what scientiﬁc knowledge would allow
for; yet, sometimes they are better managed than the available
scientiﬁc knowledge could have predicted. What these two
aspects demonstrate is that, regardless of knowledge, there is
room to improve coastal management systems.
Though the application of the precautionary principle can provide
much to think about, it is not a general environmental
management framework. Adaptive management (Walters, 1986),
or management by trial and error, has underused potential. In the
same vein, “data-less” or “data-poor management” (Johannes,
1998) is deﬁned as a management approach implemented in the
absence of the data necessary to deﬁne the parameters and verify
the models which predict the effects of different management
actions (down to statistical margins of error). Finally, “once we
free ourselves from the illusion that science or technology (if
lavishly funded) can provide a solution to resource or conservation
problems, appropriate action becomes possible” (Ludwig et al,
1993). Consequently, the key question from the standpoint of
action (Johannes, 1998) is no longer what data is needed to make
the right decision, but rather what are the best decisions that can
be made given the (incomplete and controversial) knowledge on
hand. This does not mean that scientiﬁc studies, particularly
quantitative, are not useful or advisable in many cases: they must
be well developed and often represent a necessary stage, but do
not decide which actions are taken at a given moment.
6. CONCLUSION 
The four illusions that we have discussed have a varying impact
on ICZM depending on contexts, countries, etc.: as stated in the
introduction, this article is aimed only at certain works and
examples -that we deem important- and deliberately avoid others
that do not illustrate the targeted illusions. These illusions are
due to implicit mental shortcuts and are generally not
acknowledged. Strictly speaking, they do not constitute theories
or even opinions: most of us are relatively aware of their ﬂaws, yet
concede to the peril of one or another of these illusions by reﬂex,
with readiness, or out of confusion. It is nonetheless important to
enunciate these processes clearly so as to identify their ﬂaws and
raise awareness. This makes them harder to use, and contributes
to clarifying discussion of related topics (participation, science-
management integration, etc.).Moreover, we have not only tried
to shed light on these illusions but also suggested concepts and
tools that we hope may help to better counter them.
Thus, we have demonstrated that round table discussions rest on
three successive assimilations, likening environmental
management to coordination, coordination to consultation,
consultation to consensus. In practice, these shifts are partly
responsible for the inability of numerous participatory processes
to adequately take charge of the environmental problems that
justiﬁed their inception. We have recommended (i) not to
underestimate the distributive dimension of any integration
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process, (ii) to differentiate between formal integration
(institutional or procedural) and actual integration, where we
distinguish the instruments that permit the regulation of human
activities from those that lead to putting in place such regulations.
We then discussed the coastal manager myth and the associated
idea that it is possible and even advisable to entrust the
management of a given coastal zone to a single management
entity. Again, the distinction between formal and actual
organization allowed us to suggest integration approaches based
on processes rather than procedures, which leads to accepting
the fundamentally complex allocation of coastal zone
management competence, and to adapt accordingly. 
Third, we have highlighted the community illusion, described
numerous times in development literature. By distinguishing the
“North” and “South” dimensions and by tracing their origins, we
reframed community-based management as the management of
a common, according to a clariﬁed subsidiarity principle. We have
also called not to project on developing countries’ societies
analytical and prescriptive principles (such as the community
concept) which are fundamentally different from those used in
developed countries.
Finally, we have demonstrated that the positivist illusion, very
present in coastal zone management, is to be challenged ﬁrstly
because the abundance of scientiﬁc knowledge does not
guarantee better management, and conversely, because the
incomplete and controversial nature of scientiﬁc knowledge is
seldom the real limiting factor to action. Underlining the strategic
use of uncertainty and knowledge, we directed the reader
towards resources such as adaptive management or data-
less/data-poor management. 
The work of critically questioning the foundations of ICZM and its
possible shifts is just beginning. We hope this article will
contribute to this endeavour, and that it will be intensely debated.
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